## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH OWENS,	
Plaintiff,	Case No. 2:13-cv-227
v.	HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELI
GENERA BOGE	

SENTA ROSE,

Defendant.

## **REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

This is a civil rights action brought by state prisoner Joseph Owens pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Psychologist Dr. Senta Rose denied him mental health care in violation of his rights. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Dr. Patel cancelled his medications on August 2, 2012. Plaintiff was transferred to Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) on November 28, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied treatment by Defendant Rose at LMF. Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant for denial of mental health treatment. After the grievance was filed on January 3, 2013, Defendant issued a written report that Plaintiff was diagnosed for mental health care. Defendant argues that since Plaintiff never filed a grievance against her after she allegedly issued this written report on January 3, 2013, Plaintiff failed to file a proper grievance against her and she should be dismissed from this action.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); *Kocak v. Comtv. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc.*, 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th

Cir. 2005); *Thomas v. City of Chattanooga*, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." *State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan*, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)); *see also Tucker v. Union of Needletrades Indus. & Textile Employees*, 407 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2005). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. *See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); *Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins*, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2005).

A prisoner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which Defendants have the burden to plead and prove. *Jones v. Bock*, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-21 (2007). A moving party without the burden of proof need show only that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial. *See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court*, 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000); *see also Minadeo v. ICI Paints*, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). A moving party with the burden of proof faces a "substantially higher hurdle." *Arnett v. Myers*, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002); *Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist.*, 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). "Where the moving party has the burden -- the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense -- his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." *Calderone v. United States*, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. SCHWARZER, *Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact*, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof "must show the record contains

evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it." *Arnett*, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 2000); *Cockrel*, 270 F.2d at 1056 (same). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion "is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact." *Hunt v. Cromartie*, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).

Pursuant to the applicable portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust his available administrative remedies. *See Porter v. Nussle*, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). A prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. *See Porter*, 534 U.S. at 520; *Booth*, 532 U.S. at 741; *Knuckles El v. Toombs*, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000); *Freeman v. Francis*, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999). In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural rules. *Jones v. Bock*, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007); *Woodford v. Ngo*, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006). "Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to 'properly exhaust.'" *Jones*, 127 S. Ct. at 922-23.

MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective July 9, 2007), sets forth the applicable grievance procedures for prisoners in MDOC custody at the time relevant to this complaint. Inmates must first attempt to resolve a problem orally within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control Id. at  $\P$  P. If oral resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the grievance process and submit a

completed grievance form within five business days of the attempted oral resolution. Id. at  $\P P$ . The Policy Directive also provides the following directions for completing grievance forms: "The issues shall be stated briefly. Information provided shall be limited to the <u>facts</u> involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be included." Id. at  $\P R$  (emphasis in original). The inmate submits the grievance to a designated grievance coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent. Id. at  $\P X$ .

If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten days after the response was due. *Id.* at ¶¶T, DD. The respondent at Step II is designated by the policy, *e.g.*, the regional health administrator for a medical care grievances. *Id.* at ¶GG. If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III. *Id.* at ¶FF. The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days after the date the Step II response was due. *Id.* at ¶FF. The Grievance and Appeals Section is the respondent for Step III grievances on behalf of the MDOC director. *Id.* at ¶GG. Time limitations shall be adhered to by the inmate and staff at all steps of the grievance process. *Id.* at ¶ X. "The total grievance process from the point of filing a Step II grievance to providing a Step III response shall be completed within 90 calendar days unless an extension has been approved . . . ." *Id* at ¶ HH.

Plaintiff kited Defendant Rose asking "who gave you the right to say do I need meds or not?" Defendant responded to the kite on December 26, 2012, indicating that another psychiatrist determined that Plaintiff did not need medications and that she would evaluate Plaintiff at a

scheduled appointment between January 11 and January 18. Plaintiff filed a Step I grievance on

December 17, 2012, which is attached to Defendant's brief, but the copy is not readable. From the

response dated December 20, 2012, Defendant Rose was named for denying Plaintiff medications

on December 6, 2012. The response indicates that although Plaintiff was seen on that date he did

not present with any major mental illness. Plaintiff filed a Step II grievance that was denied and a

Step III grievance that was denied on June 25, 2013. Plaintiff's complaint was filed on July 3, 2013.

Defendant argues that since she issued a written letter on January 3, 2013, as stated in Plaintiff's

complaint, this grievance could not be considered properly filed for purposes of any deliberate

indifference that occurred on January 3, 2013. Defendant is silent as to whether her alleged actions

that pertain to the grievance, denying Plaintiff medications and mental health care on December 6,

2012, could be a claim that was properly grieved and the basis for Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff

is asserting deliberate indifference to his mental health care needs and that the deliberate indifference

began as early as his transfer to LMF and at the latest on December 6, 2012. The January 3, 2013,

letter that is mentioned in the complaint and relied upon as the claim against Defendant is simply

a continuation of the alleged wrongful conduct and more evidence of the alleged deliberate

indifference that apparently began much earlier. In the opinion of the undersigned, Defendant has

failed in her burden of establishing that Plaintiff did not properly grieve his claim against her.

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Defendant's motion for summary

judgment (Docket #8) be denied.

/s/ Timothy P. Greeley

TIMOTHY P. GREELEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: May 7, 2014

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## **NOTICE TO PARTIES**

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within 14 days of service of this notice on you. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any further right of appeal. *United States v. Walters*, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).